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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA J. KIRBERG, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
WEST ONE BANK, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
No. 920706-CA 
Category 15 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules, or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an order granting the Motion for 
Summary Judgment of defendant West One Bank ("West One") on the 
breach of implied contract claim of plaintiff Patricia J. Kirberg 
("Kirberg"). In support of its motion for summary judgment, West 
One relied upon the express statement of at will employment and 
disclaimer of contractual intent found in its employment 
application, its Human Resource Manual and a booklet distributed to 
all employees entitled "Code of Conduct." West One argued that the 
conduct which Kirberg alleged created an implied contract that she 
could be fired only for cause was insufficient to overcome West 
One's express disclaimers. The district court granted West One's 
motion, holding that the disclaimer found in the application, 
Manual and Code of Conduct were in effect throughout Kirberg's 
employment, and that the conduct on which Kirberg relied was 
insufficient to overcome the disclaimer.1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Kirberg was employed by West One from October 1988 until 
February 1991. R. 041. From February 1989 until her termination 
Kirberg was the branch manager of the West Jordan branch. Id. 
Beginning in early 1990, West One's loan procedures provided that 
retail branches were to take loan applications and obtain all 
necessary information from the potential customer, but all 
'Kirberg's complaint also sought punitive damages. At the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment Kirberg's counsel 
stipulated to the dismissal of the punitive damage claim and does 
not seek reinstatement of that claim on appeal. 
1 
applications and information were then forwarded to, and loan 
decisions made by, loan officers in the installment loan department 
or the commercial loan department. R. 042. Branch personnel were 
expected to pass all relevant information regarding a loan 
applicant to the appropriate loan department. Id.2 
In approximately June 1990, Kirberg obtained a completed loan 
application and other required information from Dr. Robert Davis, 
a new bank customer. Kirberg passed the application and 
information to the installment loan department, which granted Davis 
the loan. Thereafter, Davis opened several accounts at the West 
Jordan branch, and applied for and received another loan through 
the installment loan department. R. 042-043. In mid November 
1990, Kirberg learned that some time in the past Davis had been 
barred from receiving reimbursement from federal medical insurance 
programs, had been charged with rape, and that numerous patients 
had complained about overcharging. R. 044. Following her receipt 
of this information, Kirberg again sent the installment loan 
department an application from Davis for another loan. Kirberg did 
not tell the loan officer in charge of the Davis loan about his 
previous legal problems. Davis was granted the loan. R. 043-044. 
West One did not learn of Davis' previous legal problems until 
January 1991. After Kirberg had referred Davis to Tim Conklin, a 
2While Kirberg was a branch manager, branch performance was 
evaluated in part on the basis of the amount and growth of deposits 
and on the number and size of installment loans referred to the 
installment loan department by the branch. Branch managers were 
paid incentives based on the performance of their branch. R. 04 3-
44. 
2 
commercial loan officer, in connection with a fourth loan, she 
learned from her daughter, who had been employed by Davis since 
mid-November 1990, that an FBI agent was in Davis' office looking 
at files. R. 044, 071. Kirberg then called Conklin and told him 
to proceed cautiously with the loan. Xd. Following this telephone 
call from Kirberg, Conklin learned through an independent source of 
numerous charges against Davis, including a pending rape charge, 
numerous violations of Department of Professional Licensing 
regulations and that Davis was barred from receiving reimbursement 
through federal medical insurance programs because of previous 
violations of program regulations. R. 045. Thereafter, Kirberg 
was terminated for failing to pass information relevant to a 
pending loan applicant to the loan officer making the decision on 
the loan. R. 046, 072.3 
When Kirberg initially applied for employment with the bank 
she filled out an employment application, which stated that any 
employment with the bank would be at will.4 Kirberg argues that 
3Kirberg states in her brief that she was terminated after 
West One confirmed that Davis was being investigated by the FBI. 
Appellant's Brief at 7. In fact, West One never learned one way or 
another whether Davis was investigated by the FBI. See infra at 
15. Kirberg was terminated after West One learned that she was 
aware of Davis' legal problems at the time he sought a loan but did 
not pass that information to the appropriate loan officer. 
4The disclaimer in its entirety read: 
I understand and agree that if I am employed by Moore 
Financial Group [the predecessor of West One] or any of its 
related companies or subsidiaries (the "company11) , that I may 
resign or be discharged at any time without notice and without 
cause. I understand no company representative has any 
authority to enter into an agreement with me different or 
(continued...) 
3 
the disclaimer on the West One application form was in "fine print11 
and that she did not read it. Appellant's Brief at 3. However, 
the disclaimer, which is in the same print as all other writing on 
the form, is written as a certification by the applicant that he or 
she understands these are the terms under which any offer of 
employment is made, and the applicant signs the form just below the 
disclaimer. R. 105; 118; Appellant's Addendum at V. Kirberg 
signed the application she filled out, acknowledging her acceptance 
of the terms of her employment. Id. 
West One's intent to maintain an at will employment 
relationship was expressed in two additional documents of which 
Kirberg was aware but her brief ignores. Throughout Kirberg's 
employment, the West One Human Resource Manual ("Manual"), to which 
Kirberg had access, expressly adopted an at will employment 
relationship and disclaimed any intent to create a contract. R. 
046-047. The Manual stated: 
Adherence to the policies and guidelines contained in this 
Code of Conduct [within the Manual] do not constitute an 
expressed or implied employment contract between the Company 
and its employees. All employees may resign or be discharged 
at any time without notice and without cause. No West One 
representative has any authority to enter into an agreement 
with any West One employee contrary to the foregoing. 
R. 059. 
During 1990, portions of the Manual, including the provision 
set forth above were incorporated into a separate booklet titled 
4(. ..continued) 
contrary to the foregoing. I also understand that if I accept 
employment, there is no express or implied employment contract 
between me and the company. 
4 
"Code of Conduct" which was distributed to all employees. Kirberg 
received a copy of the Code of Conduct, and signed a statement 
acknowledging that she had read it. R. 047. Furthermore, as 
branch manager, she was told that she and all employees were to 
become familiar with the booklet. Id. 
While the Manual also contained a discipline policy, contrary 
to Kirberg's allegation, that policy does not require progressive 
discipline. The discipline policy outlines a range of possible 
alternative responses in any given discipline situation and 
requires documentation of the discipline imposed.5 The policy does 
5The discipline policy states: 
CORPORATE POLICY 
Employees of Moore Financial Group whose job performance 
or conduct is substandard or who violate corporate or 
affiliate policies, practices, or regulations are subject 
to disciplinary action. Depending on the severity of the 
problem, disciplinary action may result in progressive 
discipline, a negotiated voluntary separation, or 
immediate involuntary separation. 
The company encourages harmonious working relationships 
among supervisors and employees. If possible, problems 
should be resolved on an informal basis. If more serious 
action is appropriate, the following disciplinary actions 
should be considered. 
o Supervisory counseling 
o Verbal warning 
o Written reprimand 
o Probation 
o Suspension 
o Dismissal 
Written documentation of the problem and the actions 
taken to correct it are helpful as a basis for avoiding 
misunderstanding of the issues involved, establishing a 
record of corrective action agreed upon, and knowing if 
the problem has been resolved or if more progressive 
(continued, 
5 
not state or require that the alternative sanctions listed be 
imposed in a sequential fashion. R. 061. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Kirberg was an at will employee of West One; she could be 
terminated at any time without notice and without cause. Kirberg 
has failed to allege facts sufficient to modify her expressly at 
will relationship with West One. The district court's order 
granting West One summary judgment should therefore be affirmed. 
Moreover, even if this Court were to find that an implied 
contract requiring termination only for cause existed, as a matter 
of law Kirberg was terminated for cause. Because this Court may 
affirm on any ground, it may affirm the lower court's order on the 
basis that West One had cause to terminate Kirberg. 
ARGUMENT 
I. KIRBERG CANNOT ESTABLISH A MODIFICATION OF HER AT WILL 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WITH WEST ONE 
Kirberg acknowledges that her initial employment relationship 
with West One was at will, but argues that the at will relationship 
5(...continued) 
disciplinary action is appropriate. Documentation is 
also helpful as a basis for fair and honest performance 
evaluations. 
CORPORATE GUIDELINES 
All forms of disciplinary action, be they counseling 
sessions, verbal warnings, reprimands, probation, 
suspension and-or dismissals should be documented by the 
immediate supervisor. Contact your appropriate Human 
Resource department for assistance in carrying through 
disciplinary action. 
R. 061. 
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was modified by later conduct, which created an implied in fact 
contract that she could be fired only for cause. Although Johnson 
v. Morton Thiokol, 818 P. 2d 997 (Utah 1981), holds that express 
statements adopting an at will employment relationship like those 
made by West One may be subsequently modified by statements or 
conduct, Kirberg's allegations, even if true, are insufficient to 
establish a modification of the at will relationship. 
To establish a modification of West One's express adoption of 
an at will employment relationship, Kirberg must show a clear 
manifestation of West One's intent to change the relationship, 
which was communicated to her in a manner sufficiently definite to 
operate as a contract. Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 202 Utah Adv. 
Rpt. 22, 24 (Utah 1992); Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002. Moreover, the 
manifestation of the employer's intent must be of such a nature 
that the employee can reasonably believe that the employer is 
making an offer of employment other than employment at will. Id. 
Under the above principle, establishment of an implied 
contract where an express disclaimer exists requires unambiguous 
conduct and/or express statements which are strong enough to 
overcome the presumption of at will employment and the inconsistent 
language of the disclaimer. Hodgson, 202 Utah Adv. Rep. at 23. In 
the absence of direct expressions of intent, it is not reasonable 
for the employee to believe the employer is making an offer of 
employment other than at will given the earlier disclaimer. See 
Id. at 23-24. 
7 
Kirberg argues that West One's express intent to adopt an at 
will relationship with its employee is overcome by West One's 
statements and conduct indicating that bank employees would not be 
terminated except for cause. While Kirberg's brief alludes to 
express statements that bank employees would not be terminated 
except for cause, the record is devoid of any evidence of such 
statements. Instead, Kirberg's claim of implied contract rests on 
the following factual allegations: 
7. I was given a Human Resource Policy Manual, to use in 
employee matters involving employees under me. 
* * * * * 
8. The Human Resource Policy Manual sets forth a system of 
progressive steps of employee discipline, including 
supervisory counseling, verbal warning, written reprimand, 
probation, suspension and dismissal. 
9. The Manual advises that the severity of the problem is 
related to the degree of discipline. The understanding I drew 
from the Manual, the employee discipline practices I observed, 
and the advice and training I received as a branch manager was 
that the discipline should be at the lightest (least) level 
necessary to correct the problem. 
10. Further, I understood, and was trained, that an 
employee's problems needed to be fully documented or proved 
before they could be disciplined, to justify the severity of 
any action taken. 
11. It was my understanding from the practices I observed, 
and I was taught, that an employee was not fired arbitrarily 
or without cause. I cannot think of a single instance where 
this happened. 
R. 094-095. 
In essence, Kirberg's claim rests on 1) her assertion that 
another section of the Manual suggests a system of progressive 
discipline; 2) her training by West One to document problems prior 
to imposing discipline and to impose discipline appropriate to the 
8 
offense; and 3) her observation of other disciplinary situations, 
including two specific occasions when she wanted to dismiss an 
employee for poor judgment or poor performance but was denied 
approval by her supervisor and told she must first counsel the 
employee. R. 09 5. 
The discipline policy in the Manual is insufficient to 
establish an implied contract requiring termination for cause 
because by its own terms, it does not require any form of 
progressive discipline. It simply lists a variety of possible 
discipline sanctions. More importantly, Johnson unequivocally 
holds that where a handbook or manual contains clear and 
conspicuous language disclaiming any contractual intent, as a 
matter of law no other part of the manual may be used to create an 
implied contract modifying the at will employment relationship.6 
Kirberg's allegations regarding her training and observation 
of other disciplinary situations are also insufficient to overcome 
West One's expressed intent to maintain an at will employment 
relationship. First, West One's intent that the employment 
relationship remain at will was affirmed both in the Manual, made 
available to Kirberg in 1989 when she became branch manager, and in 
6Kirberg attempts to circumvent Johnson by arguing that 
whether or not the discipline policy legally restricted 
termination, West One abided by the policy and therefore restricted 
its right to terminate. However, if the policy itself does not 
establish an implied contract in light of the disclaimer, adherence 
to the policy does not alter the at will relationship. 818 P. 2d at 
1004. 
9 
the Code of Conduct, distributed to all employees in early 1990.7 
Kirberg does not state whether the incidents on which she relies, 
including the occasions when she was not permitted to fire 
employees, occurred before or after early 1990. Any conduct 
occurring before that time is irrelevant. Johnson, 818 P. 2d at 
1004, n.29 (express intent may be overcome by a subsequent implied 
contract (emphasis added)). Also, Kirberg's allegations regarding 
her attempts to terminate employees, even if true, simply show that 
Kirberg did not have authority to terminate without approval, and 
that her supervisor did not feel termination was the appropriate 
action in two instances. None of these facts is relevant to the 
question of whether a West One manager with the authority to 
terminate an employee must have cause to do so. Nor are the two 
incidents on which Kirberg relies sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous to overcome West One's express intent to employ at 
will. Similarly, requirements of good documentation and 
proportionality of discipline are not inconsistent with at will 
employment. 
7Kirberg argues that she did not read the disclaimer found in 
the application and that it was never referred to again in her 
employment. This statement is misleading. As pointed out in the 
statement of facts, West One's disclaimer was repeated in the 
Manual and in the Code of Conduct. See supra pp. 4-5. When the 
Code of Conduct was distributed, Kirberg was expressly told to read 
and become familiar with its terms. R. 047. In any event, 
Kirberg's failure to read the disclaimer does not alter West One's 
intent to adopt an at will relationship. See e.g., Johnson, 818 
P. 2d at 1003 (disclaimer need only be clear and conspicuous to 
establish at will relationship). Moreover, as noted supra pp. 3-4 
Kirberg's statement is inconsistent with her signature found on the 
application form. 
10 
What Kirberg essentially alleges is that because West One 
practiced good management, did not fire people arbitrarily and 
trained her not to fire employees arbitrarily, it created an 
implied in fact contract requiring just cause for dismissal. Fair 
treatment of employees is simply an inadequate basis on which to 
impose an implied in fact contract inconsistent with West One's 
express adoption and reaffirmation of at will employment. While at 
will employment allows an employer to act arbitrarily, it does not 
require that an employer act arbitrarily and occasionally terminate 
an employee for no reason at all in order to maintain its status as 
an at will employer. See Hodgson, 202 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24 ("No 
employer should be required or even expected to discharge an at-
will employee for a minor infraction, even though the employer may 
technically have that right"). 
The Hodgson case demonstrates the correctness of the trial 
court's ruling in dismissing Kirberg's claim. In Hodgson, 
plaintiff was terminated without warning. Plaintiff was told in a 
preemployment interview that her employment was at will, and a 
disclaimer was found in a New Employee Checklist signed by 
plaintiff, and an employee handbook. However, plaintiff claimed 
that her at will status was modified by the employer's statements 
during the preemployment interview that the employer followed 
"disciplinary procedures," and by the employer subsequently issuing 
warnings to four employees regarding job performance. The district 
court granted summary judgment for the employer and plaintiff 
appealed. 
11 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard for 
establishing an implied in fact contract set forth in Johnson and 
found that plaintiff's evidence was not strong enough to overcome 
the disclaimers found in the manual and New Employee Checklist, 
The Court stated: 
The warnings given to four Bunzl employees were not 
sufficiently definite to constitute a contract term because 
they were too inconsistent. The employees received 
probationary periods varying from ninety days to no specified 
period, and no guidelines existed for determining what 
probationary period should be prescribed for each type of 
misconduct. 
* * * * * 
Although Hodgson may have subjectively believed that her 
employment could be terminated only after a warning, the 
standards of unilateral offer and acceptance require that 
Hodgson reasonably believe the employment was other than at 
will and this standard has not been met. 
Id. at 24. 
Like the plaintiff in Hodgson, Kirberg does not and cannot 
allege the direct statements or clear, unambiguous conduct 
necessary to overcome the disclaimer found in West One's 
application, Manual and Code of Conduct. Kirberg's allegations are 
insufficient to establish an implied in fact contract as a matter 
of law and the trial court's grant of summary judgment should 
therefore be affirmed. 
II. KIRBERG'S CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE SHE RELIES UPON 
UNAUTHORIZED STATEMENTS 
Kirberg's allegations cannot establish an implied contract 
because the representations she claims to rely upon were made by 
her supervisors and the terms of West One's written disclaimer 
contained in the application, Manual and Code of Conduct expressly 
12 
provide that no company representative has any authority to enter 
into an agreement with Kirberg contrary to or different from at 
will employment. Thus, Kirberg's reliance on her supervisor's 
statements regarding discipline cannot alter the at will terms of 
her employment. Lane v. Terminal Freight Handling Co. , 77 5 F. 
Supp. 1101, 1105 (S.D. Ohio 1991) aff'd, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 
1991)(where application and other company document provided only 
President or Vice President of company could alter at will 
relationship, reliance on statements of supervisor insufficient as 
a matter of law to establish implied contract terms). 
Kirberg argues that the foregoing provision is unenforceable, 
relying on Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 763 P.2d 761, 
768 (Utah 1988) , which held that an insurer could be estopped from 
invoking "boilerplate nonwaiver provisions if the insured 
reasonably relied upon the agent's representations to the 
contrary.11 (citations omitted) The Hardy case, which applied 
specific insurance law principles, is inapplicable in this context. 
Moreover, the pertinent language here was not simply a 
"boilerplate11 provision which Kirberg reasonably ignored in 
reliance on her superior's alleged comments.8 As stated above, the 
disclaimer in the employment application was written as a 
certification by the applicant that he or she understood the 
limitations contained therein to be the terms under which any offer 
8As set forth above in more detail, West One contends that 
Kirberg7s allegations are insufficient to vary the terms of her at 
will employment relationship regardless of the authority of her 
supervisors to vary the terms of her employment. 
13 
of employment was made, and the applicant signed the form just 
below the disclaimer. Kirberg signed her application, thereby 
acknowledging the terms of her employment. In addition, unlike 
Hardy, the disclaimer was contained in subsequent documents — the 
Manual and Code of Conduct. Kirberg had access to the Manual 
beginning in 1989, and was given the Code of Conduct in early 1990 
and told to become familiar with its contents. R. 046-047. Given 
West One's continued reiteration of its intent to maintain at will 
employment, Kirberg could not reasonably rely on statements of her 
supervisors to vary the terms of her employment. 
III. KIRBERG WAS TERMINATED FOR CAUSE 
On appeal, this Court may affirm the trial court's decision if 
it may be sustained on any proper ground. Bill Nay & Sons 
Excavating v. Neeley Const. Co., 677 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1984); 
Baqshaw v. Baqshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990). Assuming 
the Court finds Kirberg could establish an implied contract 
requiring termination for cause, the district court's ruling should 
still be affirmed because as a matter of law, West One had cause to 
terminate Kirberg. 
In the trial court, Kirberg admitted that as of November 15, 
1990, she had heard that Davis was barred from receiving 
reimbursement from federal medical insurance programs, had been 
charged with rape and that numerous patients had complained about 
overcharging. R. 044. Following her receipt of this information, 
she referred at least one loan application to a loan officer but 
did not tell that officer about Davis' past legal problems, 
14 
criminal charges or patient complaints, even though it was West 
One's policy that the character of an applicant is relevant to 
whether a loan should be made. R. 043-044; 107. Davis in fact 
received a loan from West One on the November application. Kirberg 
did not dispute that it was her duty to convey any relevant 
information regarding a loan customer to the department making the 
loan decision. R. 042. 
Kirberg argued below that her failure to convey the 
information she had was not sufficient cause for her termination, 
and that a jury could conclude Kirberg acted properly because the 
information was unsubstantiated rumor. However, Kirberg 
acknowledged that when her daughter called in January all she said 
was that an FBI agent was in the office; she had no other 
information.9 Kirberg admitted that she did not know that the 
agent was there because of Davis; it could have been an employee or 
patient. The information she learned from her daughter in January 
was no more trustworthy or definitive than the "unsubstantiated 
rumor" Kirberg heard in November. 
9In an affidavit submitted in opposition to West One's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Kirberg states that she called Conklin to 
warn him to be careful after learning that Davis was being 
investigated by the FBI. R. 097. However, in her deposition she 
stated that all she knew was that a FBI officer was in Davis' 
office; she had no other information. Kirberg admitted that she 
did not know that the agent was there because of Davis; it could 
have been because of an employee or patient. R. 104. Kirberg may 
not contradict her deposition testimony with a later affidavit. 
Gaw v. State By and Through Dept. of Transp., 798 P.2d 1130, 1140 
(Utah App. 1990) (an affiant may not raise an issue of fact by his 
own affidavit which contradicts his deposition unless he provides 
an explanation of the discrepancy). 
15 
More importantly, Kirberg's argument misconstrues the standard 
for determining whether an employer had cause for termination. A 
discharge for just cause is "one which is not for any arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal reason and one which is based on facts (1) 
supported by substantial evidence and (2) reasonably believed by 
the employer to be true.11 Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in 
Washington, Inc., 769 P.2d 298, 304 (Wash. 1989); see Braun v. 
Alaska Com. Fishing & Agr. Bank, 816 P.2d 140, 142 (Alaska 1991) 
(same) ; see also Gardner v. Portland Gen. Elec., 767 P.2d 497, 498 
(Or.App. 1989) (application of the term "willful or serious" and 
the sanction for employee's conduct were solely employer's 
decisions to make). 
For example, in Braun, the employee was discharged for 
economic reasons. The employee brought an action alleging just 
cause was required for termination and his termination was not for 
just cause. The appellate court upheld the district court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that evidence 
of the employer's good faith belief that the economic situation 
required plaintiff's termination proved good cause as a matter of 
law. 816 P. 2d at 142-43. 
In Baldwin, plaintiff was terminated by his hospital employer 
because of allegations of sexual abuse of a patient. The jury 
found for plaintiff. On appeal, the court overturned the verdict, 
finding that the jury had been improperly instructed on the burden 
of proof. The appellate court also held that the hospital did not 
have to be right, but only reasonable in its belief that the abuse 
16 
had occurred. As the court noted in Baldwin, "an employer's 
agreement to restrict discharges to those supported by just cause 
should not be followed by a further judicial implication which 
takes the determination of just cause away from the employer.11 769 
P.2d at 304. 
A holding that the factfinder may second guess an employer's 
determination of just cause would be unduly restrictive, and would 
deny an employer the right to determine the standards of conduct 
that it believes its employees must meet. Moreover, it would allow 
every employee terminated under a for cause restriction to 
challenge his or her termination before a jury. See Gilbert v. 
Tektronix, Inc. , 827 P.2d 919, 921 (Or. App. 1992) (Plaintiff's 
implied contract claim dismissed where he provided no evidence of 
bad faith, but simply disagreed with the defendant's decision to 
terminate him). 
Thus, the question here is not whether the trial court, this 
Court, or a jury believe that termination was the appropriate 
sanction for Kirberg's conduct, but whether West One's decision to 
terminate Kirberg was supported by substantial evidence which West 
One reasonably believed to be true and was not made for an 
arbitrary reason. There is no question that West One's decision to 
terminate Kirberg was based on substantial evidence, reasonably 
believed by West One. Kirberg herself admits that she submitted at 
least one loan application for Davis after she learned of his legal 
problems without revealing those problems. Kirberg did not argue 
that West One's decision was based on an arbitrary, capricious or 
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illegal reason, but simply that JJQ her iudgment her actions did not 
warrant the sanction of termination. That Kirberg, or a jury might 
apply another sanction is irrelevant. West One had just cause to 
terminate Kirberg, and the district court's order should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Kirberg argues that to affirm the district court's order would 
allow employers to use promises of job security to encourage 
employee loyalty while providing themselves an out through the use 
of a "small print" disclaimer. Kirberg's argument simply does not 
fit the facts before the court. 
Kirberg's allegations are not sufficiently definite to create 
an implied in fact contract in light of West One's express adoption 
of an at will employment relationship. The fact that until her own 
termination Kirberg thought West One treated its employees fairly 
is not inconsistent with an at will employment relationship. In 
addition, Kirberg's claim of implied contract was correctly 
dismissed because it rested on comments she knew to be 
unauthorized. Finally, even if Kirberg could establish an implied 
contract requiring just cause for termination, West One had cause 
to terminate her. The lower court's order should be affirmed. 
DATED this Ir^ day of January, 1993. 
ELIZAQjTH T. TDUNNING 
CAROLYN COX 
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS 
Broadway Center, Suite 800 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee 
18 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the 
law firm of WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS, Broadway Centre, Suite 800, 
111 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that in said capacity 
and pursuant to Rule 21(d) , Rules of the Utah Code of Appeals, four 
copies of BRIEF OF APPELLEE WEST ONE BANK were served upon the 
following: 
Daniel F. Bertch 
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
by depositing the same in the U. S. mail, postage prepaid, this 
19 day of January, 1993 
19 
